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Abstract

While empirical legal studies thrive in the U.S., this is not necessarily the

case elsewhere. Yet even in the U.S., the way in which empirical work is useful for
normative legal arguments remains unclear. This article first points out the

junction between empirical facts and normative arguments. Both teleological and
consequentialist arguments, in one of the premises, require “difference-making
facts” which point out causal relations. Many empirical research makes causal
inferences and thus constitute an essential part in teleological and

consequentialist arguments, which are typical normative arguments in legal

reasoning. Then this article offers a descriptive theory of legal reasoning. Some
empirical research does not make causal inference, but they still fall within the
domain of legal scholarship. This is because describing valid laws is a core

function of doctrinal studies of law, and sometimes only sophisticated empirical
research can aptly describe laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The relation between empirical facts and normative arguments in legal

research is a century-old issue. In American jurisprudence, it is called the divide
between “is” and “ought.” (In the German jurisprudence, it is “Sein” versus

“Sollen.”) The mainstream view appears to be that the relation is a difficult one;

that is, one cannot jump from an empirical finding to a normative conclusion.

This gap has led to different developments in the U.S. and in civil law countries. In
the U.S., empirical legal studies 1 thrive anyway. Some critics, however, point out
that empirical legal studies have a life of their own and often ignore the

normative implication. In Germany and many civil-law countries, empirical legal

scholars may find themselves outsiders of the legal communities, as their work is
not considered relevant for legal scholarship (Rechtswissenschaft), which is

usually regarded as a normative enterprise. We think these two developments
are unfortunate, and this article offers a framework to unite the empirical and
normative dimensions in legal scholarship.

Joshua Fischman makes a seminal contribution to reunite the “is” and

“ought” in empirical legal scholarship. 2 Fischman argues that 1) empiricists

should first prioritize normative questions and be explicit about the values that
motivate their research; 2) empiricists should allow substantive questions to

drive their choice of methods; and 3) empiricists need to be more explicit about
how they are combining objective findings with contestable assumptions in

order to reach normative conclusions. 3 Fischman goes further and elaborates
what he means by prioritizing normative goals and setting standards for

important empirical works. 4 Specifically, empirical research is important if it

could guide legal reform, describe important legal phenomena, and contribute to

For expanded definition of empirical studies and empirical methods, see, for instance, ROBERT
M. LAWLESS et al., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 7–14 (2009); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin,
Quantitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH 901, 905–08 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010); Peter Cane & Herbert M.
Kritzer, Introduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 1, 1–3 (Peter Cane &
Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010). While empirical methods contain both quantitative and qualitative
approaches, this article mainly defends quantitative empirical methods, even though many of
our arguments can apply to the qualitative approach as well.
2 See Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting 'Is' and 'Ought' in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 117 (2013).
3 See id. at 154.
4 See id. at 157–58.
1
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the development of theories.

We agree with almost everything Fischman says, but we wish to dig even

deeper. In the American context, we contend that the connection between

empirical and normative dimensions of legal reasoning can be made more

explicit. In the civil-law context, Fischman’s argument may not resonate with

doctrinal scholars who still cannot find a place for empirical work in their shrine
of the doctrinal study of law. 5 In this article, we offer a theory that can both

create the theoretical junction in the U.S. and weave empirical legal studies into

civil-law legal theory. Hanoch Dagan points out that “integrating empirical insight
into legal discourse requires translation.” 6 Our framework provides such a
bridging mechanism. Rubin pessimistically points out that “[w]e have no

methodology to move directly from the discourses we perceive as descriptive…to
decisions about the way to organize out society and the kinds of laws we should
establish to effect that organization. Nor does it seem likely that we will be able
to develop one.” 7 This article strikes a positive note and advances a theory to
bridge “is” and “ought.”

In short, we argue that normative arguments in legal reasoning 8 often have

to rely on sophisticated empirical facts, the products of empirical legal studies.

Teleological arguments and consequentialist arguments are embodied in much of
legal reasoning. One of the two premises in these two types of arguments is a

normative prior, whereas the other premise represents a causal relation. Many
empirical legal studies attempt to make causal inferences, and such empirical

findings can serve as premises in these types of normative arguments. Empirical
legal studies, therefore, can be normatively important.

Moreover, although not all empirical studies make causal inferences, we

claim that those that do not may still fall within the domain of “the doctrinal

See Hanoch Dagan, Law as an Academic Discipline, Available at SSRN,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228433, 20 (2013) (arguing that “[l]egal analysis needs both
empirical data and normative judgments.”).
6 Hanoch Dagan et al., Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists, LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY (2016),
forthcoming.
7 Edward L. Rubin, Law and and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 521, 546 (1997)
(emphasis added).
8 Edward Rubin, among others, points out that “the most distinctive feature of standard legal
scholarship is its prescriptive voice.” Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal
Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1847 (1988).
2
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study of law” (Rechtsdogmatik), the German-style of narrowly-defined legal

scholarship. The doctrinal study of law contains an empirical dimension as

knowing and describing valid law often requires knowledge beyond law in the

books. Empirical legal studies can aid in this respect, and thus should be counted
as legal scholarship.

The rest of the article is structured as follows: Part II elaborates the role of

empirical findings in normative arguments. Part III discusses the empirical
dimension of “the doctrinal study of law,” and explains why empirical legal
studies are less received outside the U.S. Part V concludes.

II. THE ROLE OF EMPIRICAL FACTS IN NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS

First of all, let’s get the terminology straight. A fact that can be used to justify

a normative claim is a “normative reason.” Although David Hume famously

contended that there is an unbridgeable gap between “is” and “ought,” 9 we all

constantly use empirical facts to justify our normative claims about what ought
to or should be done. We tell others to quit smoking because smoking damages

one’s health. We send our children to bed early, claiming that being an early bird
brings all kinds of health advantages. These health-related facts are empirical,

but they are also normative reasons: they explain why you ought to quit smoking
or why the children should go to bed early.

In philosophical literature, a normative reason is often defined as a fact that

counts in favor of an action. 10 However, it is not clear what “counting in favor of”

means. Even if it is understood as a justificatory relation between a fact and an

action that ought to be done, it is still not clear what kind of facts can be regarded
as reasons to justify a normative claim. Our main idea is that a normative reason
is a difference-making fact, which points out that an action or a legal measure

makes a difference as to whether or not a certain outcome occurs. This outcome
can be a valuable or desirable state of affairs, or the fulfillment of someone’s

See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds.
2000 [1739–40]).
10 See, e.g., THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 17 (1998);DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT
MATTERS, VOL. 1 31 (2011).
3
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desires. 11 For example, the fact that smoking damages health is a reason to quit,
and this fact is a difference-making one in that smoking makes a difference as to
whether or not health will be damaged. To give another example, the fact that
sleeping early will lead to an increase in children’s height is also a difference-

making one, because it shows that sleeping early makes a difference as to the
increase of children’s height. This fact is a reason to send our children to bed
early.

A difference-making fact can be conceived as a causal fact in the sense that

causes make a difference to what happens—in other words, causes are

difference-makers for their effects. 12 If we adopt a probabilistic theory of

causation, the presence or absence of the cause X makes a difference to the

probability of the effect Y. If the presence of X increases the probability that an

event Y will happen, we can state that X causes Y (or, as long as Y is concerned, X
is a difference-maker). As we will demonstrate below, the notion of normative

reasons as difference-making facts is the critical junction of empirical studies and
normative arguments.

By pointing out what differences an act makes, a difference-making fact

provides a quasi-teleological explanation of what ought to be done and thus can
be used to justify a normative claim. For example, an explanation of why one

ought to quit smoking is that smoking causes damage to one’s health; in order to

avoid this undesirable consequence, one ought not to smoke. In the same way, the
claim that children should go to bed early is justified by the fact that doing so will
lead to an increase in height. For the sake of height increase, they should go to
bed early.

A normative claim justified or explained in this way depends on a given goal

as well as on a causal fact. If one does not aim to be healthy, or if increase in

height is not a desirable consequence for children, the difference-making facts
that play the role of normative reasons in the previous examples will not be

For a difference-making-based theory of normative reasons, See Peng-Hsiang Wang & Linton
Wang, Rules as Reason-Giving Facts: A Difference-Making-Based Account of the Normativity of
Rules, in PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVITY, RULES AND RULE-FOLLOWING 199, 199–213 (Michael
Araszkiewiczet al. eds., 2015).
12 For various difference-making-based accounts of causality, see generally PHYLLIS ILLARI &
FREDERICA RUSSO, CAUSALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY MEETS SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE (2014).
4
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deployed to justify the normative conclusions. Granted, choosing a goal is a

normative decision. Yet having a goal itself does not tell us what to do and how to
achieve the goal. One who desires to be fit needs to know what the effective ways

to lose weight are. One who aims to be healthy also has to know whether quitting
smoking can prevent his health from being damaged. These effective ways imply
factual relations between causes and effects (i.e. difference-making facts)—such
as “if you jog for one hour per day, you would lose 5 pounds in a month or so.”
That is, one needs to have a firm grasp of difference-making facts to ascertain
whether performing or refraining from a certain action can achieve her goal.
Once the normative goal is settled, the justification for the normative

conclusion—that is, whether a certain action ought to be done in order to achieve
the goal—is contingent upon the relevant difference-making facts.

To be sure, one cannot derive an ought-conclusion solely from an is-premise.

Nevertheless, without an empirical premise that performing a certain action will
achieve a given goal or value, it is also a logical fallacy to jump from the goal or
value to a normative claim that this action ought to be done. Since difference-

making facts point out the consequences of actions for which they are reasons,
they can be used by an agent to deliberate on whether to perform an action in

order to bring about (or avoid) certain consequences or to achieve a certain goal.
Without the help of difference-making facts, one cannot provide a complete

explanation of why the agent ought to perform (or refrain from) this action.

This part elaborates on our point that empirical legal research that studies

causal relations are integral parts of teleological and consequentialist arguments.
Section A uses proportionality analysis, a prevalent form of normative reasoning
worldwide, as an example of the critical role of empirical facts—in particular

difference-making facts—in legal reasoning. Section B formally explains the form
of teleological and consequentialist arguments and how difference-making facts
are embedded. Section C discusses causal inferences made by empirical legal
studies. Institutional behaviors and efficacy of law are common subjects in

empirical legal analysis. Section D explains how these studies contribute to

teleological and consequentialist reasoning and their normative significance.
5
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A. Using Empirical Facts in Proportionality Analysis

To exemplify the critical role of empirical facts in normative legal reasoning,

let’s consider proportionality analysis. Proportionality analysis in constitutional
and administrative review is prevalent in the civil-law European and East Asian

countries and commonwealth countries. 13 Even in the U.S., proportionality
analysis has been inherent in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence since the

nineteenth century. 14 The proportionality analysis contains three tests15: 1) the

suitability test; 2) the necessity test; and 3) the balancing in the narrow sense
test. All three tests draw on empirical facts. The “suitability” test examines

whether the legal means are rationally related to the policy goals. The means-end
relationship is empirical in nature. Difference-making facts are required here;

otherwise the legal means are not suitable for pursuing the goal. The “necessity”
test requires the legal means to be “least restrictive.” Comparing whether a

means is more or less restrictive than another requires empirical evidence. The

last test, “balancing in the strict sense,” compares the costs of the infringement of
rights and the benefits of the legal act. While normative reasoning is involved in,
say, assigning normative weight to the infringed rights, weighing costs and

benefits is again fact-laden. Proportionality analysis is essentially “cost-effective
analysis” in economics and policy studies. 16 Put in this light, it should not be
surprising that proportionality analysis has to rely on empirical facts.

In the practice of proportionality analysis world-wide, empirical legal

research is not often cited, if at all. The indispensable role of empirical facts in

proportionality analysis is often established by implicit common sense, intuition,
or unempirical social scientific theories. While often this is enough, it does not
mean that empirical legal research should not be welcomed. Findings of

empirical legal studies provide a more solid foundation for normative reasoning.
See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATTIONAL LAW 72 (2008);Chengyi Huang & David
Law, Proportionality Review of Administrative Action in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds.,
2016), forthcoming.
14 See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Doctrine and
the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 101 (2011).
15 See Sweet & Mathews, supra note 13, 105–108 .
16 See generally RICHARD O. JR. ZERBE & ALLEN S. BELLAS, A PRIMER FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS (2006).
6
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B. Teleological and Consequentialist Arguments

Difference-making facts are mostly employed in teleological and

consequentialist arguments. 17 By pointing out the difference an act makes, a

difference-making fact provides a teleological or consequentialist explanation of
why this act ought to be or not to be done, thereby constituting a normative

reason to or not to do this very act. Teleological and consequentialist arguments
are often used in legal reasoning. Therefore, the relationship between empirical

legal studies and normative legal reasoning is as follows: empirical legal research

makes causal inferences which identify difference-making facts that are critical in
teleological and consequentialist arguments. Below we explain the role of

difference-making facts in teleological and consequentialist arguments more

formally.

1. Teleological Argument: Form and Examples

Teleological arguments as syllogisms take the following form:

(1) Goal E shall be achieved

(2) Means M helps achieve goal E (or, if M is not adopted, it is less likely, if at all,
to achieve E)

Therefore, M shall be adopted.

The major premise, a value or a desirable goal, is normative. Ascertaining

Goal E is sometimes an empirical endeavor. For instance, if E is the original intent
of the framers, it could be verified through archival work or other historical

investigations. Yet E is often a matter of value judgment and is the subject of

debate in normative legal scholarship. There is very little that empirical legal
research can do to contribute. Fischman’s admonition is that empirical
researchers should keep E in mind. 18
17
18

Once E is established, or at least clearly formulated, a normative argument

Teleological and consequentialist arguments are defined infra sub-sections 1 and 2, respectively.
See Fischman, supra note 2.
7
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depends on whether the minor premise (2) stands. The minor premise is
empirical; it represents a difference-making fact, and thus the subject of

empirical legal research. For instance, E is “awarding punitive damages in like

cases alike”; the empirical question in the minor premise is whether using juries

to determine punitive damages achieves this goal. Empirical studies, 19 if finding
a negative answer, may underpin reform proposals to put a cap on punitive
damages, or to use bench trials to assess the amount of pain and suffering
damages.

It is worth emphasizing that difference-making facts can be probabilistic.

Most, if not all, empirical legal research establishes probabilistic, rather than all-

or-nothing, results. More specifically, M may not always lead to E, but the

existence of M may increase the likelihood of E by, say, 70%. Empirical legal

research can estimate the probability, but the uncertainty in the causal relations

would affect the strength of the conclusion in the syllogism. If an empirical work
finds that the probability is 90%, there could be a case to make a strong

argument for M. If the probability is 30%, the case for M is far weaker. Of course,
adopting M or not always depend on other factors, such as whether more

effective alternatives exist, the relative costs of M and the alternative, etc. This

judgment is not necessarily empirical, and this issue is beyond the scope of the
article.

Teleological arguments, in the aforementioned or expanded form, are used

very frequently in legal reasoning. Take constitutional review as an example: in
the due process and equal protection jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court,
there are three standards of review: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and
rational review. Under all standards, state interests have to be compelling,

important, and legitimate, respectively. Once the state interests have passed

constitutional muster, they become the normative prior, the major premise of the
teleological argument. Courts then have to examine the means-end relationship

For empirical studies of this issue, see, for instance, Theodore Eisenberg et al., The
Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries,
Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts
1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T.
Wells, The Significant Association between Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster
Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2006).
8
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and the relationship has to be narrowly tailored, substantial, and rational,

respectively. 20 Whether the means-end relationship can sustain constitutional

review often depends on a difference-making fact that is ascertainable, yet often
presumed, only through sophisticated empirical research.

To be more concrete, let’s look at a few cases where a difference-making fact

is involved in constitutional review. In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., the U.S.

Supreme Court declared constitutional an Oklahoma law that prohibits any

person not a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses to a face or to
duplicate or replace into frames lenses, except upon written prescription by an
Oklahoma licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist. 21 The Court justifies the

regulation by the reasonable intuition that requiring prescriptions would

encourage more frequent eye examinations, enabling early detection of more

serious eye illness. 22 Adopting a regulation that promotes better detection of eye
illness is a difference-making fact, which could be more firmly established by
quantitative studies.

Grutter v. Bollinger is a landmark case in which the United States Supreme

Court upheld the affirmative action admissions policy of the University of

Michigan Law School. 23 The Court relied on the inference that students with

diverse backgrounds enhance classroom discussions and the educational

experience, as well as promote cross-racial understanding. 24 This is a differencemaking fact that can be empirically tested. Indeed, Daniel Ho and Mark Kelman
use a natural experiment at Stanford Law School to test a similar pedagogical
question that asks whether class sizes reduce the gender gap. 25

In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the

Detroit statute that limited the number of adult bookstores or adult theaters

within 1000 feet. 26 The Court reasoned that a concentration of adult theaters
See JESSE H. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291–93, 313 (2008). It is worth noting here that the
strict scrutiny is very close to the proportionality analysis discussed in Part II.A.
21
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
22
Id.
23
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
24
Id.
25 See Daniel E. Ho & Mark G. Kelman, Does Class Size Affect the Gender Gap? A Natural Experiment
in Law, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (2014).
26
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
9
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causes the area to become a focus of crime. 27 This “secondary effect” justifies the
city ordinance. 28 Again, the court took wholesale this difference-making fact

claimed by the Detroit government, while the effect of adult bookstores and
theaters can be empirically verified (though not necessarily in Detroit). 29
2. Consequentialist Argument: Form and Examples

The form of consequentialist arguments is as follows:

(1) Means M leads to Result C

(2) Result C is desirable (or, C is undesirable)

Therefore, M shall be adopted (or, M shall not be adopted).

Teleological and consequentialist arguments share the similar structure, the

only difference being the flipped major and minor premises. The major premise

here is a difference-making fact (M leads to C), whereas the minor premise is the
normative evaluation. The key point is that both forms of arguments require
difference-making facts.

Differences exist between these two types of arguments. Unlike teleological

arguments, the consequence here (C) is not necessarily the realization of some
value; rather, C could be a side effect of a legal measure. Moreover, when

employing teleological arguments, the advocate usually has a specific goal in

mind and assumes a certain relation between means and ends. Empirical legal

research is oftentimes an ex post examination of the presumed minor premise.
The purpose of this kind of empirical work would be clear. Again, this is what

Fischman proposes. 30 By contrast, in consequentialist arguments, the empirical
studies may go first. That is, once a causal inference is conducted, a researcher
would evaluate the result and then make a case for or against the means. As a
result, the normative significance in this type of research might be more
27

Id.
Id.
29 A forthcoming issue in NYU Law Review encompasses a symposium titled “Testing the
Constitution.” The papers published there further demonstrate the critical junction of empirical
research and constitutional reasoning.
30 See Fischman, supra note 2.
10
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ambiguous. Nonetheless, one should not jump to the conclusion that this type of
research is useless for normative reasoning. Sometimes, the normative

significance is not apparent because the normative goal is still in dispute or

unexplored. Empirical scholarship cannot contribute to this. Sometimes, this
kind of empirical research marks the beginning of normative debates.

Consequentialist arguments are also often used in legal reasoning. Once

again, using constitutional review as an example: pragmatic judges 31 and
scholars would consider multiple values for constitutional review. Philips

Bobbit’s seminal six modalities of constitutional arguments include “prudential
argument,” which is “actuated by facts.” 32 Facts that reveal consequences of
constitutional interpretations are thus often taken into account.

Two famous cases rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court, among others, utilize

consequentialist arguments. In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,

Chief Justice Warren, when delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, cited
social science and psychology research to demonstrate that the detrimental

effect of segregation is unlikely to be undone. 33 The sense of inferiority felt by
African American children affects their motivation to learn and leads to other

problems with mental development. In Lawrence v. Texas, the majority opinion
delivered by Justice Kennedy states that criminalizing homosexual conduct

subjects gay persons to discrimination and imposes a stigma on them. 34 Such
detrimental effects are apparently undesirable. These consequentialist

arguments form an important part of the court’s persuasive force and normative
stance.

3. When Are Teleological and Consequential Arguments Not Used?

Teleological arguments and consequential arguments incorporate
difference-making facts, making empirical legal studies normatively relevant. Our
case for the normative relevance of empirical work, however, would meet a
setback if legal reasoning often takes other types of argument forms. We divide
31
32
33
34

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996).
See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 18–19 (1991).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
11
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the legal reasoning into two prototypes: legislative and judicial reasoning.
Legislative reasoning is often used by the legislature. Legislature is not
bound by the text of its own prior promulgation and the constitutional text is
often not taken literally. As a result, legislature can make policies rather freely,
and legislators in floor debates often implicitly or explicitly draw on teleological
or consequential arguments.
In judicial reasoning, a further distinction can be drawn between easy cases
and hard cases. In hard cases, or when constitutional courts handle cases,
consequential and teleological arguments are often the bread and butter. Easy
cases appear to be different, while at the meta level it may not be. In easy cases,
courts can solve disputes according to the plain meaning of a statute or a judgemade doctrine. In other words, textual interpretation, without reliance on
difference-making facts, suffices. A deeper question is why easy cases CAN be
solved just by reference to the text or by prioritizing text. 35 This is not selfevident. The priority of textual interpretation is a value-laden meta-teleological
argument. That is, the major premise is something like “the point of rule of law is
treating like cases alike”, “legal certainty, predictability, or deference to the intent
of the democratic legislator are desirable ends.” The minor premise, again, is a
seldom-verified empirical claim—a difference-making fact—that textual
interpretation can indeed and has already helped achieved the aforementioned
goals; in other words, adopting the textual interpretation will make a difference
to the achievement of legal certainty, predictability, democracy…etc. Hence, even
though textual interpretation does not itself contain a difference-making fact, the
choice of this interpretive approach is the product of a (meta-)teleological
argument, one that can benefit from more solid empirical studies to confirm the
intuition of many.
It is worth noting that which difference-making facts are relevant in legal
reasoning depend upon the goals or values stated in the major (minor) premise
of the teleological (consequentialist) arguments. In both types of arguments,
normative conclusions are derived from normative premises together with
empirical premises. For instance, from the major premise that the government
should reduce the number of murders, and the minor premise that death penalty
deters murders, 36 one may derive a normative conclusion that the government
should execute people on the death row and maintain capital punishment. What

Cf. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (distinguishes easy, hard, and very hard cases, and contends
that easy cases should be solved by the applicable legal authorities while (very) hard cases seeks
the aid of theories—and, we may add, empirical evidence.)
36 But see John J. Donohue & Justin J. Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death
Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2006)(challenging the deterrence effect of death penalty.)
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kind of empirical premises—i.e., normatively relevant difference-making facts—
are needed and can be used in such arguments depends partly on the normative
position adopted as the major premise. If the major premise states another goal
that should be achieved—say, retribution—the empirical minor premise has to
be changed accordingly. Nonetheless, whether the normative position expressed
in the major premise holds cannot be fully established by the difference-making
facts. 37
C. Empirical Legal Studies Make Causal Inference

We have now hopefully established that difference-making facts, which

embody causal relations, are critical in normative legal reasoning. The next
question is whether empirical legal studies can say anything about causal

relations. As is well known, correlations are not causations. 38 Without observing
the counterfactuals, there is no way to establish causal relations. This is the
fundamental problem of causal inference. 39

While whether and what type of empirical examination can identify causal

inference is still heavily debated within statistical science, 40 we take the position

that carefully designed empirical research enhances our understanding of the
relationship between means and ends (or, X on Y), and is thus relevant to

normative legal arguments. 41 More specifically, we do not take the extreme
position that no social science research can ever claim causal inference;

otherwise, one can never make any grounded teleological or consequentialist
arguments, as any intuition regarding the effect of X on Y would be faulted as

well. Surely many estimates by empiricists would later be rejected or revised, but
this does not make empirical research irrelevant to normative arguments. There
are flawed pure normative works, but they do not render all normative works

useless. Empirical research that uses the higher standard in identifying causal

relations, such as randomized controlled experiments, regression discontinuity

The literature on the morality of the death penalty is vast. For two different positions, See for
example Jimmy Chia-Shin Hsu, Does Communicative Retributivism Necessarily Negate Capital
Punishment?, CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1 (2013) and Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally
Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2005).
38 See HOWELL E. JACKSON et al., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 539–41 (2003).
39 See LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 6 (2014).
40 See id. at 193–195.
41 See id. at 14.
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approach, instrumental variable approach, to name a few, could be given more
weight in evaluating the strength of normative legal arguments that draw on
empirical results derived from these types of legal research. 42 But let us

emphasize once again that other types of carefully executed empirical research is
useful and relevant to normative legal reasoning too.

Moreover, we are not entirely pessimistic about identifying causes and

effects in law. Correlation with causal asymmetry enables researchers to make a

legitimate causal claim. That is, if X could cause Y but Y cannot possibly cause X, a
strong correlation can only imply that X is a difference-maker in terms of Y. For

instance, if strong correlations exist between judges’ gender and the amount of
punitive damages, researchers can claim that gender affects the amount of

damages, not the other way around, as judges’ gender cannot be changed by the

damages awards. In addition, temporal priority (a cause X must precede its effect
Y in time) gives researchers more confidence in claiming (not in the Humean

sense, though) causation. Of course, confounding factors, endogeneity problems,
and other empiricists’ nightmares always lurk in the background. This is a

reminder that only carefully executed empirical work can serve as a basis for
strong normative legal arguments.

D. Institutional Behaviors and Efficacy of Law

Some empirical research is explicitly framed as investigating difference-

making facts. Others are less so. Another line of empirical research, studying

42 There is a vast literature on this issue. For the literature with an emphasis on empirical legal
studies, see, for instance, Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(2002); EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 39; LAWLESS et al., supra note 1; Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan
Klick, Empirical Law and Economics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi
ed. 2015 forthcoming); D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 533 (2008); Steven L. Willborn & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics Is a Plural Word, 122 HARVARD
LAW REVIEW FORUM 48 (2009); Daniel E. Ho, Randomizing... What? A Field Experiment of Child
Access Voting Laws, 171 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 150 (2015). For the literature in
statistics and social science, see, for example, Kenneth A. Bollen & Judea Pearl, Eight Myths About
Causality and Structural Equation Models, in HANDBOOK OF CAUSAL ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 301,
(Stephen L. Morgan ed. 2013); Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of
Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469 (1987); Jeremy
Freese & J. Alex Kevern, Types of Causes, in HANDBOOK OF CAUSAL ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 27,
(Stephen L. Morgan ed. 2013);Herbert L. Smith, Research Design: Toward a Realistic Role for
Causal Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF CAUSAL ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 45 (Stephen L. Morgan ed.
2013); ILLARI & RUSSO, supra note 12.
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institutional behaviors and efficacy of law, however, also finds out facts that are
normatively significant. This section demonstrates this relation.

Institutional behaviors refer to the law-related behaviors of judges, juries,

prosecutors, legislators, government officials, etc. Many empirical studies are

devoted to examining the effect of attorneys in litigation 43 and the behavioral

pattern of judges and juries. 44 Indeed, the study of judicial behavior is becoming
a field of its own. Researchers identify whether and to what extent demographic
characteristics of judges, juries, or litigation parties; cognitive biases; and case
facts influence the verdicts.

Efficacy of law includes a broad swath of research. Checking the divide

between law in books and law in action 45 is the classic approach. Criminal law
scholars examine the effect of various law enforcement measures such as

increasing the number of police. 46 Other scholars study whether statutes, case
laws, administrative rules, internal by-laws, and so on, change people’s
behaviors. 47

43 See, e.g., Kuo-Chang Huang, How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcome: An Empirical
Perspective from Taiwan, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197 (2008);David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon,
The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1145 (2007);Yun-Chien Chang et al., Attorney and Judge Experience in Torts Litigation: An
Empirical Study, working paper (2015).
44 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN et al., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013);CASS R. SUNSTEIN et al., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE
(2002);VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
(2000);Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Damage Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
148 (2011);Yun-Chien Chang et al., Pain and Suffering Damages in Wrongful Death Cases: An
Empirical Study, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 128 (2015);Yun-Chien Chang et al., Pain and Suffering
Damages in Personal Injury Cases: An Empirical Study, working paper (2014);Theodore Eisenberg
& Michael T. Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux? An Empirical Study of State Trial Courts on
Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 100 (2015);Theodore Eisenberg & Kuo-Chang Huang, The
Effect of Rules Shifting Supreme Court Jurisdiction from Mandatory to Discretionary—an Empirical
Lesson from Taiwan, 32 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW & ECONOMICS 3 (2012);Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et
al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006);Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007);Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009);Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 167 (2007);Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2000).
45 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
46 See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122
YALE L.J. 574 (2012);Daniel E. Ho et al., Do Police Reduce Crime? A Reexamination of a Natural
Experiment, in EMPIRICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 125,
(Yun-Chien Chang ed. 2014);Ming-Jen Lin, More Police, Less Crime: Evidence from Us State Data, 29
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (2009);Thomas Miles, An Empirical Analysis of the Fbi Ten Most Wanted
List, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 275 (2008).
47 See, e.g., Ryan Bubb, The Evolution of Property Rights: State Law or Informal Norms?, 56 J. L. &
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Studies on institutional behaviors and efficacy of law are normatively

relevant because teleological and consequentialist arguments are implicitly or
explicitly embedded. Take, for example, the judicial and jury behavior studies:

rule of law dictates that like cases should be treated alike. 48 If judges or juries
suffer from cognitive biases such as the anchoring effect, 49 or they rule

differently due to their own or the parties’ race or gender, the equality principle
becomes a hollow hope. Some empirical studies stop at reporting their findings
of the rationality or irrationality of judicial or jury behaviors, while others spell
out the normative significance of their quantitative work. The causal relations
found by both types of works, however, can serve as a premise in

consequentialist or teleological arguments, whereas the rule of law is the other
premise.

Given that the normative prior is fulfillment of the rule of law—or, more

concretely, for example, race should not be a determinant in whether the

defendant will face the death penalty 50—empirical studies that examine whether

or not race is a factor serves as the difference-making facts in the major premise
of the consequentialist argument. The minor premise, naturally following from

the normative prior, is that race discrimination in courts is bad. The conclusion is
that the state of the world in which race is a factor in sentencing is normatively
undesirable. The empiricists can (and sometimes do) go one step further,

proposing reforms that can effectively reduce the effect of race—a follow-up

teleological argument thus emerges:

(1) reducing the effect of race in sentencing is normatively desirable
(2) reform proposal M reduces the effect of race in sentencing
Therefore, M should be implemented

ECON. 555 (2013).
48 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208–10 (Revised ed. 1999);RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 336–39 (8 ed. 2011).
49 See Yun-Chien Chang et al., Anchoring Effect in Real Litigations, working paper (2016);Doron
Teichman et al., Anchoring Legal Standards: An Empirical Examination, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
(2016 forthcoming);Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, Judicial Decisionmaking: A Behavioral
Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 664 (Eyal Zamir &
Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
50 See John J. Donohue, The Death Penalty, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2013), available
at http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/104.
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In other words, studies on institutional behaviors are often the major premise in
consequentialist arguments, if not also paired with other normatively significant
facts in teleological arguments. Thus, such empirical studies are normatively
important.

Studies on the efficacy of law embody teleological and consequentialist

arguments. For instance, legislatures either explicitly announce their policy goals
in the statutes or implicitly disclose their intentions in floor debates, hearings, or
other legislative materials. Statutes contain clauses regarding civil or criminal
fines, regulatory or criminal penalty, to name a few, to achieve the goals. The
notice and registration mechanism in sex offender law is a prime example. 51

Empirical work that examines whether Means M (the legal measures adopted by
statutes) contributes to the fulfillment of E implies a teleological argument as
long as the goal has a clear normative value. No matter if M is effective or not,

these difference-making facts can be used as the minor premise in teleological
arguments.

Oftentimes, empirical studies on the efficacy of law embody both teleological

and consequentialist arguments at the same time. Such studies may find that

Means M does contribute to the fulfillment of a desirable Goal E, at the expense of
the side effect C. A teleological argument focusing on M and E concludes that M
should be adopted, whereas a consequentialist argument focusing on M and C
concludes that M should be reconsidered. The trade-off between E and C is

ultimately a normative decision. That said, solid empirical studies are able to

pinpoint the probabilities that M will lead to E and C and to identify the scope
and magnitude of E and C, and thus aiding policy-makers in making more

informed decisions. Also, a theoretical debate on the trade-off between E and C
may become moot if empirical studies uncover that E or C does not exist in
practice.

See J.J. Prescott & J. E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect
Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161 (2011).
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III. A DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING

American legal philosophers are interested in exploring “what is law?”, 52
but few, if any, spend their career defining precisely what legal scholarship 53 is
or what legal studies are. Indeed, with the flourishing “law and” scholarship in
American legal academia, the only feasible, encompassing definition of legal
studies seems to be “any studies in which law is the subject matter,” and the “law”
in this definition is likely to be more wide-ranging than the definition of law in
the question of what law is. 54
In Germany and many other countries influenced by German jurisprudence,
legal scholarship is Rechtsdogmatik, translated as “legal doctrine”, 55 “legal
dogmatics”, 56 or “the doctrinal study of law.” 57 For legal scholars under this
paradigm, the task of the doctrinal study of law (the translation we prefer) has
“generally been defined as (i) the investigation of the content of the legal order,
and (ii) the systematization of legal concepts and norms. These tasks are
interrelated, too: the content of legal order is not independent of the method of
systematization, and vice versa.” 58 Put differently, the doctrinal study of law
interprets and systematizes valid law. 59
These definitions, however, fail to highlight the contributions of empirical
analysis, and thus are insufficient for our purpose. German legal philosopher
Robert Alexy, by contrast, categorizes the doctrinal study of law into three
distinct yet inter-related dimensions: empirical, analytical, and normative. These
dimensions correspond to describing valid law, analyzing legal concepts and
systems, and making proposals for the interpretation of legal rules or for legal
reforms, respectively. 60 Alexy does not systematically articulate the empirical
dimension of the doctrinal study of law, although he does point out that this
dimension includes describing valid law and using empirical facts in legal
arguments. We discussed the latter in the previous part. This part focuses on the
former. Section A elaborates what kind of empirical works exhibit the empirical
See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986);SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011).
For such endeavors, see, e.g., Rubin, supra note 7; Rubin, supra note 8; Dagan, supra note 5;
Dagan et al., supra note 6; Edwards, supra note 7.
54 But cf. Dagan et al., supra note 6.
55 ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, SCIENTIA JURIS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AS KNOWLEDGE OF LAW AND AS A SOURCE OF
LAW 1–2 (2005).
56 Aulis Aarnio et al., The Foundation of Legal Reasoning III, 12 RECHTSTHEORIE 423 (1981).
57 AULIS AARNIO, ESSAYS ON THE DOCTRINAL STUDY OF LAW 19–24 (2011);ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE
10–11 (1959).
58 Aarnio et al., supra note 56.
59 See AULIS AARNIO, REASON AND AUTHORITY: A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMIC PARADIGM OF LEGAL DOGMATICS
75 (1997);PECZENIK, supra note 55.
60 See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 251–52 (1989).
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dimension of the doctrinal study of law. Section B discusses why the empirical
dimension has been largely ignored so far in civil-law countries.
A. Empirically Describe Law

Describing valid laws has been part of what jurists have done for a long time.

This is particularly evident in the U.S. Compiling restatement of law, writing a
casebook or a Kommentar (Commentary), and similar endeavors all count as

describing valid laws. Although it is conventionally understood that one of the
main tasks of the doctrinal study of law is to describe valid laws, this type of
work does not exhaust the traits of the descriptive task.

Rather than viewing laws solely as a system of norms, we consider legal

systems also as systems of procedures that consist of enacting, applying,

interpreting, and enforcing norms. A descriptive theory of legal reasoning, which
is also an important task in describing valid laws, delineates what reasons the
participants of the procedures (such as legislators and judges) employ in

enacting, applying, or interpreting legal norms and what factors influence their
institutional behaviors, but it does not necessarily evaluate the merits of those
reasons or factors. The usefulness of descriptive legal reasoning should not be
underestimated. As Theodore Eisenberg aptly puts, “by providing an accurate

portrayal of how the legal system operates, empirical legal analysis can influence
not only individual cases, but also larger policy questions. Much room for

progress exists because misperceptions about the legal systems are common.” 61
Under this definition of the descriptive theory of legal reasoning, studies on

institutional behaviors can be part of it, particularly those who do not aim to
examine certain difference-making facts. For instance, research on whether

judges and juries suffer from the anchoring effect furthers our understanding on

how irrelevant factors can affect case outcomes via judges’ and jurors’ heuristics.
Our point is that there are empirical studies that do not fall squarely within

the domain of conventional institutional behavior studies, and yet they are an
essential part in the descriptive theory of legal reasoning. Put differently, we

61 Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical Methods and the Law, 95 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION 665, 667
(2000).
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argue that quantitative empirical studies are often necessary to describe valid
laws. Restatements or casebooks are not close substitutes for these works.

Hence, certain empirical legal works serve a double role in doctrinal studies.
More concretely, a casebook or a restatement project usually surveys

selected cases rendered by the highest court of a jurisdiction, and summarizes
legal ruling and its evolution. The reporters of law rely on the words of, say,

judges to construct a coherent picture of law, but sometimes this is incomplete.

This might be particularly true in equity cases, which are adjudicated on a caseby-case basis, and thus inherently more difficult to understand and describe

systematically. 62 One of us has empirically investigated an essentially equity

power in the civil law—how district courts in Taiwan used their power awarded
by Article 796-1 of the Taiwan Civil Code to preserve buildings that encroach
over land boundary. 63 The Taiwan Civil Code requires that judges take into

account both the public and private interests of the two parties before deciding
to remove or preserve a building. In the judicial opinions, judges often dutifully
expound how they weigh the public and private interests. Attorneys who read
through the legal reasoning would not be able to accurately predict which
direction the judge would go in their clients’ cases. By contrast, logistic

regression models show that the size of the encroached land is the most

important predictor of the court decision. This pattern could hardly be detected
by the naked eye. One has to properly code the hundreds of cases and use the
correct statistical model to tease it out. Comprehensive understanding of the
boundary encroachment doctrine in Taiwan and elsewhere is not attainable
without the aid of empirical legal research.

Another example is what drives courts’ decision to opt for partition in kind

or partition by sale. One of us, 64 in examining the claim by Michael Heller65 that

The complexity of restitution is a case in point. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA.
L. REV. 65 (1985);Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits,
108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009).
63 See Yun-Chien Chang, To Tear Down or Not to Tear Down? An Empirical Study of Boundary
Encroachment Cases in Taiwan, in EMPIRICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 144, 144–58 (Yun-chien Chang ed. 2014).
64 See Yun-Chien Chang, Tenancy in “Anticommons”?: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of CoOwnership, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 515 (2012).
65 See MICHAEL A. HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS,
STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008).
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resources held in tenancy-in-common would become tragedy of the anti-

commons, has used partition data from Taiwan and demonstrated that courts

there were inclined to opt for partition by sale when ordering partition in kind

would lead to fragmentation of land, even though the Taiwan Supreme Court and
Article 824 of the Taiwan Civil Code prioritize partition in kind. One of us also

demonstrates that district courts in Taiwan order partition in kind in only 23% of
overall cases. 66 A studious reader of property law treaties and supreme court
partition cases would probably guess that lower courts must use partition in
kind in most cases, while this is far from the truth. This is an example of the

usefulness of quantitative studies to tease out differences between law in books
and law in action. 67

How judges or juries weigh facts to assess tort damages is also an important

and practical legal question, but is rarely treated in conventional doctrinal

studies, which focus on questions/reasoning of law, not questions/reasoning of
facts. Normative theories can help us critique the weight given by judges to

various factors, but they are not useful in teasing out how much weight has been
given to which factor. Here, again, even when judges are simply faithful

interpreters/appliers of the law, there is always room for their discretion. How

judges have used their discretion is often unascertainable without sophisticated
empirical studies. The pattern of assessing the amount of pain and suffering
damages without set schedules or formula is a case in point. 68

In summary, this section argues that some empirical studies, even when not

serving as the direct basis for normative reasoning, describe valid laws. This type
of empirical work should be counted as an integral part of legal scholarship even

See Chang, supra note 64.
Other empirical works that have found that law in action differs greatly from law on the books
are abound. For instance, one of us studies administrative appeal review committees under the
Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan, which is in charge of conducting de novo review of merits of
administrative decisions made by agencies under the Ministry. The finding is that the review
committee studied rarely, if ever, conducted merit review—it only conducted legality review. That
is, administrative agencies have turned the mandate into their discretion. See Yun-Chien Chang,
An Empirical Study of Administrative Appeal in Taiwan: A Cautionary Tale, 23 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 261 (2014).
68 For how judges in Taiwan, with large discretion, determined the amount of pain and suffering
damages, See Yun-Chien Chang et al., Non-Pecuniary Damages for Defamation, Personal Injury, and
Wrongful Death: An Empirical Analysis of Court Cases in Taiwan, 4 CHINESE J. COMP. L. (2016),
forthcoming; Chang et al., supra note 44; Chang et al., supra note 44.
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under the paradigm of German jurisprudence, not to mention that in the U.S. and
elsewhere.

B. Empirical Research in Common versus Civil Law Countries

Above we note that empirical legal studies are viewed to be valuable in and

of itself in the U.S., while in civil-law countries empirical legal studies are still a
hard sale in law faculty. In addition to the general explanation as to why social

scientific research flourishes in the U.S. but not elsewhere, 69 we further contend

that the differences in the legal theory of judicial adjudication in common versus
civil laws contribute to the aforementioned phenomenon.

In common-law countries, where case laws carry a lot of weight and judges

unabashedly make policies (or, decide what the law is), 70 it is natural for jurists
to sort out the trend in case laws and what drives the federal and state supreme
courts in making policies. 71 Because juries decide facts despite often being

composed of one-shot jurors, they have become a closely-inspected research

subject. It is only a step further to draw on quantitative methods to empirically
describe case laws and investigate judicial behaviors. The fertile soil in the U.S.

for the growth of social scientific research facilitates the burgeoning of empirical
legal studies.

In Germany and other civil-law countries influenced by Germany, laws are

mainly statutes and administrative rules authorized by statutes. The code-centric
design makes statutes the starting point of describing valid laws, if not also the
end point. Judges are considered to apply, rather than make, laws (and many

judges do refrain from making new laws). This normative prior makes empirical
studies of institutional behaviors an afterthought, as judges’ demographic

See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics
in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555 (2008);Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter,
The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics Vs. German
Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008).
70 As Justice Holmes famously put it: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
461 (1881).
71 See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political
Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
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characteristics should not matter and thus need not be studied. This is not to say
that European and Asian civil-law jurisdictions do not have any “law and”

research. Surely there are some, but much of the scholarship is produced by

social scientists outside the law faculty, and this type of work is only gradually

received by mainstream legal scholars who build their careers on normative and
conceptual doctrinal work.

IV. CONCLUSION

Legal scholarship has a wide empirical dimension. On the one hand, the

doctrinal study of law sometimes has to go empirical to aptly describe valid law.
On the other hand, legal reasoning is normative, but empirical facts are also

essential to such normative reasoning. Difference-making facts, which identify
causal relations, are indispensable premises in teleological and consequential
arguments. And teleological and consequential arguments are prevalent in

legislative policy-making and in the judicial reasoning, especially in hard cases.

Quantitative empirical legal studies contribute to normative reasoning because
many of them aim to make causal inference. “Is” and “ought” can be united.

Quantitative empirical legal studies are fundamental in legal scholarship.

That is, no matter whether the jurisdiction is common-law, civil-law, or mixed,
difference-making facts have to be relied on to make normative claims.

Normative lawyers should be more explicit about the empirical nature and

foundation of their normative claims, and be more open to the possibility that

their claims might be rejected if the hopefully explicit or still implicit cause-andeffect is not borne out by empirical evidence. Empirical lawyers should strive to

make their social-scientific works more normatively relevant by spelling out the
related policy issues and how their findings could fit in teleological or

consequential arguments. Legal reasoning would not be complete without
carefully formulated normative theory and neatly executed empirical
investigation.
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